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The Wall Street Journal - August 20, 2004
To Terminate Pension Plans
By SUSAN CAREY Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL August 20, 2004; Page A2 CHICAGO -- United Airlines' parent, UAL Corp., said in a court filing that it likely will terminate its pension plans in order to become a viable business, and it defended its decision to stop funding the plans, citing a devastating run-up in fuel prices and its precarious cash position. UAL, which has been excoriated by two of its unions, a federal pension insurer and the Labor Department for missing a July pension contribution, said it hasn't made a final decision on terminating the four underfunded plans, which cover 120,000 workers and retirees. In a filing in U.S. Bankruptcy Court here, UAL said it "would like nothing more than to keep the pension plans intact." But business realities dictate that the company "could not make its minimum funding contributions and maintain sufficient liquidity to operate its business," the company said in its filing. UAL said that it hopes in talks with its unions, creditors and others in the next few weeks to find a modified business plan that keeps the pensions intact, but also provides sufficient liquidity and is financeable. Termination would require the court's assent and entail transferring the plans' assets, $6.9 billion, and obligations, $12.8 billion, to Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., the pension insurer, and creating less costly, follow-on defined-contribution retirement plans. Hurt by the termination would be those among the 58,000 retirees whose benefits would be curtailed by caps mandated by Congress, and the 62,000 current employees who probably would receive less-generous retirement benefits in the future. UAL in June was denied federal financial aid that would have allowed it to exit from court protection later this year. Now, the company is on the hunt for commercial financing, a search that is shaping up to be difficult and time-consuming, given the weak pricing climate and high fuel expenses plaguing the industry. So the company amended the terms of its interim, debtor-in-possession financing to double the amount to $1 billion and to extend the maturity by six months through June of next year. This facility, which requires the approval of U.S. Bankruptcy Court Judge Eugene Wedoff, essentially precludes UAL from making pension payments for the duration of its stay in Chapter 11, unless its lenders consent. The amended financing, and the various objections to it by two unions and the PBGC, are on the judge's agenda at a hearing scheduled for today. UAL said in a motion supporting the new financing pact that it would have decided not to make $570 million of pension payments due in July, September and October in any case. "Even with an additional $500 million ... and the suspension of pension payments, United is by no means sitting on 'excess' cash," the company said in its filing. "Making more than $500 million in pension payments over the next two months would drastically and negatively impact current liquidity levels and dig an even deeper hole for United at exit." The PBGC, the International Association of Machinists Union and the Association of Flight Attendants have objected to the interim financing pact, claiming that skipping pension payments violates federal law. The Labor Department has questioned UAL's decision in June to switch the plans' fiduciary responsibilities from a group of senior UAL executives to the company itself, a "judgment-proof" entity in court protection. As a result, UAL and the Labor Department have agreed to appoint an independent fiduciary to ensure that the interests of workers and retirees are protected. Also on the agenda for today's hearing is UAL's motion to extend by four months its exclusive right to field a reorganization plan. That period currently expires on Aug. 30, which means creditors or other interested parties then could propose rival plans of their own. UAL argues that it needs more time as it tries to cut its costs further, enhance its revenues and look for exit financing. The extension has been opposed by the Machinists union, the flight attendants' group and the Air Line Pilots Association.
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Politicians fool only themselves with Medicare bribeToday's column is offered as a textbook illustration of the
principle that voters are far shrewder than most politicians believe. This
case study highlighting Washington's inability to fool anyone is based on a
recent survey of the attitudes of people on Medicare about their new
prescription-drug benefit. ### RETURN TO INDEX
Forbes.com - August 12, 2004 – Entire Article
Money &
Investing
The problem is that many companies like Allegheny (nyse:
ATI -
news -
people ) still haven't recovered from the stock market fall nearly four
years ago, which not only dragged down their stock but also shares in their
pension portfolios. More than half the companies in the S&P 500 had
overfunded pensions in 1999. Now only 51 do.
### RETURN TO INDEX The Wall Street Journal – August 11, 2004
Editorial -
The Coming Taxpayer Bailout United Airlines's recent announcement that it will skip payments to its four pension funds while it is in Chapter 11 has some observers murmuring about a government bailout. And not just any old bailout, but something akin to the hundreds of billions spent on the savings-and-loan debacle in the late 1980s. An overreaction? Unfortunately, no. What has people nervous is that United's decision to stop contributing to its pension plans is not as limited as it might seem. The carrier skipped its July payment of $72 million, and the September contribution of almost $500 million and the October one of almost $100 million will also be missing in action. United has not made a decision, but it says it is considering dumping its pension plans altogether. Few companies have restarted their retirement plans after they emerge from bankruptcy. To get rid of its four plans, United would have to persuade the bankruptcy court that a so-called distress termination is necessary for its very survival. This isn't a frivolous argument. New investment money is balking at assuming pension debts that could be as high as $7.5 billion, with about half due before 2008. If the court agrees, what's to prevent the other major carriers from engaging in a similar ploy? American, Continental, Delta and Northwest are all struggling and would no doubt love to dump their underfunded pension plans too. This is precisely what happened in the steel industry a few years ago; one terminated plan encouraged other steel companies to get out from under their own pension obligations. Here's where the situation begins to bear an uncomfortable resemblance to the S&L bailout. Just as the thrifts were insured by a government agency, so are pension plans. When a company terminates its plan, it gives the plan's assets and liabilities to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. The PBGC assumes responsibility for pension payments, making up the difference (within certain limits) of any underfunding in the plan. In 2002, Bethlehem Steel off-loaded $3.6 billion in unfunded pensions on the PBGC in the biggest hit to the agency so far. A United Airlines dump would be almost double that. If that's not bad enough, the PBGC itself had a deficit of more than $11 billion last year. Since the government stands behind the PBGC to make up the difference, if United caused a domino effect in the rest of the industry, the result could be tens of billions of dollars in a bailout underwritten by taxpayers. None of this should be unexpected. Government insurance creates an unintended moral hazard. That is, companies can promise retirement benefits knowing that the federal government will bail them out if necessary. Companies can also use the insurance to help them restructure bad business practices; dumping pension plans on the government becomes a type of strategy to refinance. Trouble in the PBGC is no surprise either. Last spring, the PBGC's growing deficit prompted the White House to offer a wide-ranging piece of reform legislation to tighten up funding requirements for company pensions. What emerged from Congress however was a big, fat bailout for underfunded plans, especially in the airline and steel industries. Instead of putting pensions on a sounder basis, the final bill liberalized funding accounting and relieved the airlines and steel from making accelerated contributions to reduce their funding gaps for two years. Mr. Bush signed the Pension Funding Equity Act on April 10, which not only postponed the day of reckoning but allowed the shortfalls to grow even larger in the interim. As a final insult to taxpayers, it's not clear that writing a put option for company pension plans always works out. US Airways, which was in bankruptcy during 2002 and 2003, off-loaded its pilots' pension plan to the PBGC. Yet it is once again flirting with another bankruptcy filing. The PBGC has attacked the suspension of United's pension contributions as illegal and is demanding that the carrier explain how it would restart its plans. It is a wussy response, but it's about all the PBGC can do. That and wait for the burgeoning crisis to hit. Which it will. ### RETURN TO INDEX Newsday - August 11, 2004 – Entire ArticleSurvey: Seniors seek fix to Medicare, not overhaulBY
DEBORAH BARFIELD BERRY
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In an echo of the savings and loan industry collapse of the 1980's, the federal agency that insures company pensions is facing a possible cascade of bankruptcies and pension defaults in the airline industry that some experts fear could lead to another multibillion-dollar taxpayer bailout.
``The similarities are incredible,'' said George J. Benston, a finance professor at Emory University in Atlanta who has written extensively on the regulatory failures that led to the costly savings and loan bailout.
Deposits in savings institutions are, like pensions, guaranteed by a federal insurance program. The savings industry first sickened because changes in market conditions made the traditional way savings and loans operated unprofitable, but government delays and policy missteps then made the situation much worse. In the end taxpayers bailed out the industry - at a cost, according to various estimates, of $150 billion to $200 billion.
Now experts say they see similar forces gathering in the pension sector, with United Airlines perhaps the first to go down the path. Operating in bankruptcy, United is striving to attract the lenders and investors it needs to survive. It said last month that it would no longer contribute to its pension plans; United also seems intent on shedding some or all of its $13 billion in pension obligations as the only way to succeed in emerging from bankruptcy proceedings.
If United manages to cut itself loose from the costly burden of its pension plans, it might force others determined to keep their costs similarly under control to emulate its move. ``Rivals may feel they are at a competitive disadvantage and follow suit, raising the specter of a domino effect in the industry,'' said Bradley D. Belt, the executive director of the government’s Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which insures pensions. If every airline with a traditional pension plan were ultimately to default, the government would be on the hook for an estimated $31 billion. Its insurance coverage is limited, so some employees would have their benefits reduced.
“The pension insurance program is there to protect workers’ benefits,” said Mr. Belt, who took over the agency in April. “It shouldn’t be used as a piggy bank to help companies restructure.”
Already, some airline employees are taking steps to protect themselves against future pension losses. Each month, for example, about 30 pilots normally retire from Delta Air Lines. But in June, almost 300 did.
Andrew Dean, one of the new retirees, said he and his colleagues watched in dismay as the financial debacle unfolded at United. He said that he and many of his fellow pilots decided they had better grab their pensions right away while the money was still there.
“These are very scary times right now for someone in my position,” said Mr. Dean, who at 58 walked away from his job just as he was reaching the peak earning period of his career. His pension was also reduced because he retired early.
But his decision now looks prescient. On Friday, Delta asked its pilots for a 35 percent pay cut and proposed a smaller pension plan.
Foremost on the minds of the departing pilots, Mr. Dean said, were arcane pension rules that can offer advantages to workers who quit before a pension plan fails. At Delta, for example, as long as the pension plan stays afloat, pilots are allowed to take half of their benefit in a single check when they retire. But if the plan fails, the pilots lose their chance to take a big payout.
“What I’ve managed to do is secure half of my retirement,” Mr. Dean said. He may still lose the rest if the government takes over the program and limits future payouts. “I really lose sleep over that,” he said.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation is already hobbled by debt, having picked up the pieces of more than 3,200 failed pension plans in its 30-year life. The scale of the failures has risen sharply in the last three years, but the agency has few tools at its disposal to prevent the situation from becoming worse.
Now it faces a possible $5 billion default by United which would be a record and the possibility of more big airline defaults after that.
“The agency can’t take a lot of $5 billion hits, multiple times per year, year after year, and survive,” said Steven A. Kandarian, the pension agency’s immediate past director. “Eventually, you’ll run out of money.”
It is impossible to predict the exact size of any pension bailout, although economic projections by the agency suggest that in the worst case, a bailout within the next decade involving failures beyond the airlines could cost taxpayers up to $110 billion.
But because pension obligations, unlike bank deposits, do not have to be paid off all at once, it is difficult to raise alarms about the threat.
“The real blowup doesn’t happen right away; it happens over time,” Mr. Kandarian said. “You’ve got to address it now, but it doesn’t look like a crisis now. The crisis is always over the next hill.”
The risk is that the longer the problems are avoided, the worse they can get. “With the S.&L.’s, what was a relatively small problem in the early 1980’s became over a $100 billion problem in the late 1980’s,” said Mr. Kandarian, who fears the same thing will happen to the pension system.
United, the nation’s second-largest carrier behind American, is one of the worst off of the airlines. The entire industry has been coping with high fuel prices and flagging demand, particularly since the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
But United and the other five remaining major carriers that grew up in a world of regulated routes and ticket prices American, Continental, Delta, Northwest and US Airways face even more fundamental problems. In recent years, all of them have struggled to compete with the new, low-cost carriers like Southwest, JetBlue and AirTran that have much lower overhead.
United has been operating in bankruptcy proceedings since December 2002. Already, it has negotiated significant concessions from its workers, suppliers, landlords and others. United says it is still analyzing what to do with its pension plans.
In June, the Air Transportation Stabilization Board turned down United’s request for federal loan guarantees, saying it believed the airline could get financing without government help. So far, United has not been able to. Until it does, it cannot emerge from bankruptcy proceedings.
It is an open secret that prospective financiers are turned off by the roughly $13 billion of pension debt United is carrying on its books the one big block of debt that the airline has left untouched so far. That figure is the value, in today’s dollars, of the pensions that United’s pilots, flight attendants and other workers and retirees have earned. Once a pension has been earned, it cannot legally be taken away.
By law, this debt to the work force is to be secured by the money United sets aside in its four big pension funds. But as things have turned out, United had only about $7 billion in the pension funds as of last December.
The remaining $6 billion is unsecured debt. Pension law and bankruptcy law differ on the implications of this: pension law says the $13 billion owed to the workers cannot be taken away, while bankruptcy law says the workers are unsecured creditors with respect to the $6 billion shortfall. And unsecured creditors usually lose in a bankruptcy case.
If, in the coming months, United persuades its bankruptcy judge that it cannot survive without canceling its pension debts, then the airline will be allowed to unload some or all of its $13 billion obligation, helping it line up the financing it needs to emerge from bankruptcy proceedings.
The pension debt, and the $7 billion United has already set aside in pension assets, will go to the federal pension agency, which will pay the airline’s retirees their benefits, but only up to certain limits.
Hard as that would be on the employees of United, it is also an alarming prospect to the employees of the other major carriers.
“Things start to set a precedent,” Mr. Dean, the retired Delta pilot, said. “If a bankruptcy court allows a company to terminate its pensions, then that becomes a very tempting business tool.”
That is what happened in the steel industry. LTV Steel’s pension fund fell to the government in March 2002, and its unencumbered assets steel mills, coke and lime plants, railroads and other properties were snapped up at once. That put pressure on other tottering steel companies to shed their pension plans as well.
Seven more failing steel plans went to the government before the year was out, including the current record-holder among pension defaults, the Bethlehem Steel plan, which cost the pension agency $3.9 billion to take over.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way. In 1974, Congress responded to an ugly string of pension failures in the auto industry by passing landmark legislation. From then on, any company that promised pensions to its workers would be required to set aside enough money to pay them. Rules were written to determine how much money was enough. To weave the retirement safety net even more tightly, Congress also created the pension insurance program.
Those protections were hailed as “the greatest development in the life of the American worker since Social Security” by Senator Jacob K. Javits, the New York Republican who died in 1986.
But for many workers, those protections no longer look so secure. “You see that the whole thing could really be a house of cards that could come crashing down,” Mr. Dean said.
United’s pension plan developed its multibillion-dollar shortfall, in part, because pension law allows companies to fund their plans with the assets that any prudent investor would select. Over time, that has meant a shift away from the very conservative bonds that companies used to secure pensions before the 1974 law, in favor of more aggressive investments.
Stocks have become the investment of choice, but today many pension funds seek to bolster their returns even more by adding relatively small amounts of hedge funds, junk bonds and other risky assets. This investment approach can produce attractive returns over time, but can be very volatile and much more dangerous if companies are forced to pay off some of their pension obligations in a down market.
As the pension system has weakened, some specialists have called for measures that would discourage the riskiest investments. As director of the pension agency, Mr. Kandarian proposed charging higher insurance premiums to companies that invested their pension funds in riskier assets, particularly companies that were in bad shape themselves. No one paid attention.
“I was naïve,” Mr. Kandarian said.
Along with Mr. Kandarian, current officials at the pension agency and at the Treasury Department have also been calling for a tightening of the rules requiring pensions to set aside enough money to meet their obligations. In April, Congress loosened the rules instead. The biggest flexibility was given to the most troubled industries, making their pension funds look healthier.
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REUTERS -
July 29, 2004 – Entire Article
Kaiser says
Pensions group taking over plan
SAN FRANCISCO, July 29
(Reuters) - Kaiser Aluminum Corp. (KLUCQ.OB:
Quote,
Profile,
Research)
said on Thursday the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. intends to assume
responsibility for the Kaiser Aluminum inactive pension plan, retroactive to
June 30, 2004.
Houston-based Kaiser, which filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in
February 2002, said the inactive plan generally covers hourly retirees who
were represented by unions at several smaller Kaiser plants where operations
were discontinued a number of years ago.
The federal Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC) said the Kaiser inactive
plan covers more than 2,900 former Kaiser workers.
The plan has about $49 million in assets and $96 million in liabilities,
and the PBGC said it expects to be liable "for virtually the entire $47
million shortfall," according to a statement on the PBGC Web site,
http://www.pbgc.gov.
Kaiser said the U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Delaware has ruled that the
company met legal requirements for a "distress termination" of the inactive
pension plan and several other plans.
The PBGC took responsibility for Kaiser's salaried employees pension plan
last December.
###
The New
York Times - July 28, 2004
–
Entire Article
Airline Woes Threaten U.S. Pension Agency
By REUTERS
WASHINGTON
(Reuters) - Looming insolvency at pension plans run by bankrupt United
Airlines and other struggling companies could overwhelm the U.S. agency that
insures plans and force it to seek a taxpayer bailout, the agency's former
head says.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation expressed
alarm this week after United, a unit of UAL Corp. (UALAQ.OB), said it would
stop contributing to its pension plans while under bankruptcy protection,
raising the specter of default.
``The PBGC wasn't designed to withstand the level of underfunding that we
are now witnessing in the system,'' former PBGC executive director Steve
Kandarian, who stepped down in February, said in a telephone interview with
Reuters.
But the options available to the PBGC -- the agency that stands behind
traditional corporate pensions and pays benefits up to certain limits to
retirees when plans go broke -- may be limited, according to another former
PBGC official.
The pension agency already has a deficit of $9.7 billion. A decision by
United to scrap its pension plans, leaving the PBGC to pay benefits, would
add another $5 billion to its red ink, the agency says, potentially its
biggest hit ever.
Some fear other airlines with underfunded pensions could follow suit. The
PBGC says 11 companies in the sector have $31 billion in underfunding in
plans covering 444,000 people.
``How does the agency withstand that kind of an assault, when you are
talking about a $5 billion potential claim coming in from one company and
possibly more multibillion claims in the queue?'' he said.
These obligations would be paid out over time, and the agency has enough
cash to keep paying out benefits for the near term. But a United pension
failure, if it happens, ``certainly does add to the probability that you
would need a taxpayer bailout in the future,'' Kandarian said.
LIMITED LEGAL OPTIONS
The PBGC insures traditional ``defined benefit'' pension plans, which offer
a fixed payout at retirement. Already most of the claims to the agency in
its 30-year history have come from the steel and airline sectors.
United said last week it would stop making payments to its pension plans but
says no decision has been made on whether to terminate them. Airline
representatives are expected to meet PBGC officials to discuss the matter
this week.
While the agency has pronounced United's move to skip payments to its
pension plans illegal, PBGC officials have not said what they might try to
do about it.
The PBGC's options are limited, said Gary Ford, a former general counsel at
the agency.
He said the agency could ask a court to terminate United's plans, taking
them over before a default, if it felt its costs with respect to the plans
were increasing unreasonably,
Ford said the Secretary of Labor also has standing to sue United in
bankruptcy court, seeking an order to require the company to make the
pension funding payments it is skipping. A request for such action would
have to originate with the PBGC.
But Ford said he believed the storm could be weathered.
``The agency's way of measuring pension liabilities is the most
conservative possible way,'' said Ford, who now works at the Groom Law Group
in Washington, specializing in employee benefits law.
``My personal view is, no, they won't be swamped,'' he said. ``They've had
big claims before. I think the agency will weather these claims and remain
as a safety net for pensioners.''
No matter what happens with United, Kandarian says Congress should change
pension funding rules so underfunding does not keep threatening the agency.
He thinks companies with junk bond ratings should have to fund their plans
at a higher level.
``They may also need to make some tough decisions about the size of the
benefits they offer to their workers,'' he said.
###
The New York Times
- July 27, 2004 – Entire Article
U.S. Wants Details on United's Pensions
The federal government said yesterday that
United Airlines acted illegally in halting contributions to its pension
plans and gave the airline until Thursday either to explain how it would
revive the plans or acknowledge that it was abandoning them.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
took the unusual step of setting a deadline and making it public because of
the extraordinary size of the pension funds at stake. United's four largest
pension funds have a total of about $7.5 billion less than the amount they
need to pay all promised benefits, according to a government estimate. The
pension agency has calculated that it would be liable for about $5 billion
of that should United default on all four of the plans. Certain airline
employees would bear the rest of the losses as reductions in their benefits.
Losses on that scale would eclipse the current record, set by Bethlehem
Steel's pension fund in 2002. When the government took over
Bethlehem's failed pension plan, it incurred losses of about $3.6 billion.
Thousands of retired steelworkers also experienced reductions in their
benefits, totaling about $500 million.
Employees of United have been expressing grave concerns about their pension
plans since mid-July, when the airline missed $72.4 million in mandatory
contributions. Their worries intensified on Friday, when United disclosed
that it had amended its agreements with the lenders who are financing its
operations under bankruptcy protection and that those amendments
"effectively" prohibited it from making any more pension contributions.
It is all but unheard of for a troubled company to cease making pension
contributions while in bankruptcy, then revive the plan later.
When a company shuts down a pension plan, it is required to give employees
and the federal government 60 days' notice. So far, however, United has said
only that it is researching its options and trying to determine whether it
can emerge from bankruptcy without terminating
one or more plans.
In a letter to United's chief executive, Glenn F. Tilton, the pension agency
warned that keeping the plans alive without contributing to them "increases
the risk of loss to plan participants and to the federal pension insurance
program." The unfunded obligations rise because the employees continue to
build their benefits, even though the company has stopped setting aside the
money to pay them.
"The interests of plan participants are best served" by keeping the pension
plans going, wrote Bradley D. Belt, the pension agency's executive director.
"Therefore, the P.B.G.C. would like specific information regarding how UAL
intends to close the growing funding gap in these plans." The UAL
Corporation is the airline's parent.
United is scheduled to pay more than $4 billion into the four plans in the
coming years.
"Please provide a detailed explanation of how the company's business plan
will enable it to meet these obligations," Mr. Belt wrote. "On the other
hand, if UAL intends to terminate any of its defined benefit pension plans,
the P.B.G.C. and plan participants should be made aware of that fact as soon
as possible."
Mr. Belt recalled that representatives of United were scheduled to meet
with the pension agency on Thursday and said the matter should be addressed
then.
A spokeswoman for United said that the airline's board was scheduled to
meet on Thursday and that United therefore might not be able to send the
appropriate people to the pension meeting on that day. She said United would
try to reschedule the pension meeting.
###
United Airlines said today it
would not contribute to employee pension plans while it remains in Chapter
11, a move likely to save it billions of dollars in cash and make it more
attractive to the investors it needs to emerge from bankruptcy protection.
United also said it was considering its options on the plans' future, which
union leaders interpreted as a signal that it will move to terminate the
plans. The action came a week after United skipped a $72.4 million pension
payment that it owed to three of its four pension plans. United also faced
making hundreds of millions more in pension payments in September and
October.
The plans have enough assets to keep paying benefits to retirees for now,
but none of the four plans has enough to assure that employees will receive
future benefits they have already earned. If the airline abandons the plans,
billions of dollars in liabilities for those future benefits will fall on
the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, a
government-sponsored agency whose finances have already been ravaged by the
collapse of pension plans at other bankrupt companies in the airline, steel
and other industries.
Leaders of some of United's unions reacted with outrage to United's
decision. Industry experts said they could not remember another instance
when a bankrupt airline had not made pension payments. Indeed, until last
week, United had met all of its pension obligations since filing for
bankruptcy in December 2002.
The action by United came as it told a bankruptcy court in Chicago that it
had replenished its debtor-in-possession financing, originally arranged soon
after its bankruptcy filing. It said the newly arranged financing would be
good until June 30, 2005.
Originally, United borrowed $1 billion to keep its operations going while it
waited for an answer from a federal loan board on its bid for a guarantee
package, which it hoped to use as the basis of its restructuring.
But the Air Transportation Stabilization Board turned down United's
application on June 28, saying it believed United could find lenders without
government assistance. Soon after, the airline, which had already cut costs
by $5 billion a year, warned union members they had to expect to make
further concessions.
Industry analysts said lenders would be unwilling to invest in United, which
owes its pension plans an estimated $4.1 billion over the next five years.
On today, United acknowledged that.
"In the absence of a federal loan guarantee, United's long-term business
plan must have cash flow and liquidity levels that the capital markets are
willing to finance," the airline said in a statement.
It went on, "Because existing pension plan contributions will remain a huge
financial burden after exit, it is incumbent on United to study all possible
options and to determine whether United can sustain this burden and still
attract exit financing." United said the move would not have any day-to-day
impact on union members' pension payments.
Robert W. Mann, an industry consultant based in Port Washington, N.Y., said
the airline was bowing to fiscal reality. "New lenders and new equity don't
like to pay old bills," Mr. Mann said.
But Patricia Friend, president of the Association of Flight Attendants,
termed the action "demoralizing." Said Ms. Friend, "Current management
should explain to us why the flight attendants should continue to support
their restructuring, if this is the best they could do."
Ms. Friend said she believed United would terminate its plan, a step that
labor experts said would be a historic blow to the labor movement. David
Gregory, a labor law professor at St. John's University in Queens, said
pensions have long been one of the three basic tenets that a union can
provide its members, the others being health care coverage and good wages.
"This goes against what unions were set up to provide," said Professor
Gregory.
He said the move was even more notable given that United was an
employee-owned company, before it sought bankruptcy protection. Union
leaders, in fact, had the power to hire and fire the chief executive. Now,
19 months later, they faced the prospect of management dissolving their
retirement plans. "This is a blow to the concept of employee ownership,"
Professor Gregory said.
Should United terminate its pension plans, it will have to negotiate
replacements with its labor unions, most likely at much less generous
levels. Gary Chaison, professor of industrial affairs at Clark University in
Worcester, Mass., said United's statement today was the first move in what
he expected would be bitter bargaining.
"They'll be working off a sense of anger and betrayal," said Professor
Chaison.
Last year, United obtained concessions worth $2.5 billion in a year in
savings from its unions, a few months after it sought bankruptcy protection.
But it made few adjustments to its pensions, at the time, a move that may
have given unions a false sense of security, he said.
"What we saw was act one," Professor Chaison said. "Now this is act two. It
may turn out to be a tragedy. It's a terrible thing for a union to have to
negotiate something like this."
###
The Denver Post - July 15, 2004
Qwest retirees sue for audit data
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Angry over a lack of information from the government, Qwest Communications retirees have sued the Labor Department to get details from an ongoing audit of a company pension fund that lost about $6 billion over a three-year period.
Qwest blames the plunge in value on the faltering economy and an increase in benefit payments, but retirees worry there may be problems in the wake of federal investigations into the company's accounting practices.
"Our concern right now is that there is potential - potential because we don't know - misuse or not responsible fiduciary management of that pension fund, and that would be perhaps one of the primary reasons why the fund dived," said Nelson Phelps, president of the Association of US West Retirees.
A Labor Department spokeswoman declined to comment because of the lawsuit and the agency's own investigation involving the Denver-based telecommunications company, which serves 14 states.
In 1999, the pension fund totaled $14.6 billion, which included a surplus of $5.7 billion. By the end of 2002, the fund had a $314 million deficit. It improved by the end of 2003 to $9.01 billion - slightly more than fully funded, which is the level necessary to pay every participant, said Kimberly Walker, Qwest vice president of finance.
Qwest said a big reason for the drop in value was a $5 billion-plus increase in benefit payments due to downsizing.
"That hits the liabilities as well as the assets," said Walker, who is also president of Qwest Management Co., which handles investments of employee benefits. "It explains a lot, obviously, of the asset drop; in fact, almost all of it."
The fund also took a hit because of the economic downturn and declining interest rates.
The retirees say there may be more to it.
For example, they say the fund lost about $67 million in a high-risk investment between October and December 2001. Qwest spokesman Steve Hammack declined to comment on that claim.
In March, retiree Mimi Hull of Denver submitted a Freedom of Information Act request to get documents the Labor Department has gathered as part of an audit begun in 2001. The request was rejected a day later by agency officials who said they could not release the information because of the ongoing investigation. An appeal was denied.
The company has as many as 70,000 retirees.
###
BusinessWeek - July 19, 2004 Issue – Entire Article
Old-line
companies have pledged a trillion dollars to retirees. Now they're
struggling to compete with new rivals, and many can't pay the bill.
June 28 was the day hope ran out for United Airlines' 35,000 retirees. That
was the day the government announced it would not guarantee the bankrupt
airline's loans -- virtually assuring that if UAL Corp., (UALAQ
) the airline's parent, is to remain in business it will have to chop away
at expensive pension and retiree medical benefits. The numbers are daunting.
UAL owes $598 million in pension payments between now and Oct. 15, and a
total of $4.1 billion by the end of 2008, plus an additional $1 billion for
retiree health-care benefits, obligations the ailing airline can't begin to
meet. And if United finds a way to get out of its promises, competitors
American Airlines (AMR
), Delta Air Lines (DAL
), and Northwest Airlines (NWAC
) are sure to try to as well.
UAL workers are about to find out what other airline employees already know:
The cost of broken retirement promises can be steep. Captain Tim Baker, a
19-year veteran of US Airways Inc. (UAIR
), was one of several union representatives sorting through that airline's
complicated bankruptcy negotiations in March, 2003. Of the airline's many
crises, the biggest was the pilots' pension plan, a sinkhole of unfunded
liabilities. Baker reluctantly agreed to back US Airways' proposal to dump
the pension plan on the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. (PBGC), the
government agency that is the insurer of last resort for hopelessly broken
plans. It's a move that practically guarantees that retirees will receive
less than they were promised, in some cases less than 50 cents on the
dollar. But of a raft of bad options, it seemed the only one that could keep
the company afloat. "It was the pension underfunding and its future
requirements that were going to put in jeopardy the airline's ability to get
out of bankruptcy," says Baker. "At some point you have to look around and
say that is all there is."
Baker has paid dearly for that decision. He was voted out of his union
position by angry fellow pilots and instead of the six-figure annual pension
he was promised, when he retires in 15 years he'll get just $28,585 a year
from the PBGC, plus whatever he can save in his 401(k).
Stories like Baker's are becoming dreadfully common as employers faced with
mounting retiree costs look to get out from under. It's not just troubled
industries like airlines that are abandoning their role as retirement
sponsors to America's workers, either. The escalating cost of retirement
plans is a critical issue at a range of long-established companies from
Boeing (BA
) to Ford Motor (F
) to IBM (IBM
), many of which compete against younger companies with little or nothing in
retiree costs.
SHIFTING THE RISK
As employers abandon ever-more-costly traditional retirement plans, the
burden is falling on individuals and taxpayers
Why are retirees being left out in the cold? An unsavory brew of factors
have come together to put stress on the retirement system like never before.
First, there's the simple fact that Americans are living longer in
retirement, and that costs more. Next come internal corporate issues,
including soaring health-care costs and long-term underfunding of pension
promises. Perhaps most important, in the global economy, long-established
U.S. companies are competing against younger rivals here and abroad that pay
little or nothing toward their workers' retirement, giving the older
companies a huge incentive to dump their plans. "The house isn't burning
now, but we will have a crisis soon if some of these issues aren't fixed,"
says Steven A. Kandarian, who ended a two-year stint as the executive
director of the PBGC in February. Kandarian is not optimistic about how that
crisis might play out, either. "By that time it will be too late to save the
system. Then you just play triage."
As industry after industry and company after company strive to limit -- or
eliminate -- their so-called legacy costs, a historic shift is taking place.
No one voted on it and Congress never debated the issue, but with little
fanfare we have entered into a vast reorganization of our retirement system,
from employer funded to employee and government funded, a sort of stealth
nationalization of retirement. As the burden moves from companies to
individuals -- who have traditionally been notoriously poor planners -- it
becomes near certain that in the end, a bigger portion will fall on the
shoulders of taxpayers. "Where the vacuum develops, the government is forced
to step in," says Sylvester J. Schieber, a vice-president at
benefit-consulting firm Watson Wyatt Worldwide (WW
). "If we think we can walk away from these obligations scot-free, that's
just a dream."
EVIDENCE OF THE SHIFT is everywhere. Traditional pensions --
so-called "defined-benefit" plans -- and retiree health insurance were once
all but universal at large companies. Today experts can think of no major
company that has instituted guaranteed pensions in the past decade. None of
the companies that have become household names in recent times have them:
not Microsoft (MSFT
), not Wal-Mart Stores (WMT
), not Southwest Airlines (LUV
). In 1999, IBM, which has old-style benefits and contributed almost $4
billion to shore up its pension plans in 2002, did a study of its
competitors and found 75% did not offer a pension plan and fewer still paid
for retiree health care.
Instead, companies are much more likely to offer defined-contribution plans,
such as 401(k)s, to which they contribute a set amount. In 1977, there were
14.6 million people with defined-contribution benefits; today there are an
estimated 62.5 million. Part of their appeal has been that a more mobile
workforce can take their benefits with them as they hop from job to job. But
just as important, they cost less for employers. Donald E. Fuerst, a
retirement actuary at Mercer Human Resource Consulting LLC, notes that while
even a well-matched 401(k) often costs no more than 3% of payroll, a typical
defined-benefit plan can cost 5% to 6% of payroll.
Despite the stampede to defined-contribution plans, there are still 44
million Americans covered by old-fashioned pensions that promise a set
payout at retirement. All told, they're owed more than $1 trillion by 30,000
different companies. Many of those employers have also promised tens of
billions of dollars more in health-care coverage for retirees. Even
transferring a small part of the burden to individuals or the government can
have a profound impact on the corporate bottom line. The decision by
Congress to have Medicare cover the cost of prescription drugs, for example,
will lighten corporate retiree health-care obligations by billions of
dollars. Equipment maker Deere & Co. (DE
) estimates that the move will shave $300 million to $400 million off its
future health-care liabilities starting this year.
The U.S. Treasury, on the other hand, pays and pays dearly. That drug
benefit, which takes effect in 2006, is expected to cost the government the
equivalent of 1% of gross domestic product by 2010, and other potentially
big taxpayer costs are looming, too. In mid-April, over the objections of
the PBGC, Congress granted a two-year reprieve from catch-up pension
contributions for two of the most troubled industries: airlines and steel.
Congress also lowered the interest rate all companies use to calculate
long-term obligations, lowering pension liabilities. While these moves
lighten the corporate burden, they increase the chances taxpayers will have
to step in. "The less funding required, the more risk that's shifting to the
government," says Peter R. Orszag, a pension expert and senior fellow in
economic studies at the Brookings Institution. "The question is: How
comfortable are we with the risk of failure?"
Company-sponsored health care, which generally covers retirees not yet
eligible for Medicare and supplements what Medicare will pay, is likely to
disappear even faster than company pensions. Subject to fewer federal
regulations, those benefits are easier to rescind and companies are fast
doing so. It's much harder to renege on pension promises. So instead, many
profitable companies are simply freezing plans and denying the benefits to
new employees. Last fall, Aon Consulting (AON
) found that 150 of the 1,000 companies they surveyed had frozen their
pension plans in the previous two years, a dramatic increase from earlier
years. Another 60 companies said they were actively considering following
suit.
STRESS ON A FRAGILE SYSTEM
The government bailout fund is $9.7 billion in the red, and Social
Security and personal savings are hardly going to be enough
The cost of honoring PBGC's commitments could be higher than anyone is
expecting. The government bailout fund has relied on having enough healthy
companies to pony up premiums to cover plans that fail. But in a scenario of
rising plan terminations, healthy companies with strong plans still in the
PBGC system would be asked to pay more. For corporations already fretting
that pensions have become a competitive liability and a turnoff to
investors, this could be the tipping point. Faced with higher insurance
costs, they could opt out, rapidly accelerating the system's decline as the
remaining healthy participants become overwhelmed by the needy. In the end,
the problem would land with Congress, which could be forced to undertake a
savings-and-loan-type bailout. It's almost too painful to think about, and
so no one does. But when the bill comes due, it will almost certainly be
addressed to taxpayers.
Most worrisome is the record number of pension plans in danger of going
under. According to the PBGC, as of September, 2003, there was at least $86
billion in pension obligations promised by companies deemed financially
weak. That's up from $35 billion the year before. And it's on top of a
record number of companies that managed to dump their troubled pension plans
on the PBGC last year: 152. In 2003, a record 206,000 people became PBGC
pensioners, including 95,000 from its biggest takeover ever, Bethlehem Steel
Corp.
Even for healthy companies, pensions have become a serious drag. The
companies of the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, for example, continue to
run an aggregate pension deficit of $149 billion, according to David Bianco,
an accounting analyst at UBS (UBS
). That's despite a strong stock market in 2003, which pushed up pension
plan assets, and despite the billions companies contributed, including $18.5
billion from General Motors Corp. (GM
) alone. If conditions don't change, Bianco figures the S&P 500 companies
will end the year $192 billion in the hole.
WHAT TODAY MIGHT be seen as an isolated problem for a limited number
of companies promises to bloom into big trouble for us all. By conventional
math, the PBGC is already insolvent: As of September, 2003, it had $46.5
billion of liabilities and only $35 billion of assets, a deficit of $11.5
billion that had close to tripled in one year. The agency paid 2003 benefits
of $2.5 billion, but only took in $1 billion of premium income from
companies with defined-benefit plans. (The PBGC says the deficit had dropped
to $9.7 billion as of March, but can't give further details.) The PBGC is
not directly funded by the taxpayer, but it is backed by the U.S.
government, which would likely bail it out in a crisis.
The fragility of that system only increases the stress on other sources of
retirement income and insurance: Social Security, Medicare, and personal
savings. Social Security has its own $11.9 trillion deficit. And the
still-recent history of personal savings vehicles like 401(k)s shows that
people generally save too little, pay too much in fees, and fail to
adequately diversify their risk. Olivia S. Mitchell, executive director of
the Wharton School's Pension Research Council, is among the many who think
one result is that we will all have to work longer than we thought. "It used
to be thought Social Security was the safe leg of the retirement stool, but
that's not safe either," says Mitchell.
Demographic trends will only make matters worse. As recently as 1985 there
were three U.S. workers for every retired person. Now it's close to even.
And we're still six years away from 2010, when the first of the baby boomers
will hit 65. Not only are more people retiring, but they're living longer
once they get there. Today 17% of the U.S. population is age 60 or older.
According to Census Dept. data, that figure will rise to 26% by 2050, when
college graduates entering the workforce today can finally begin to think
about retiring. It's the complete reversal of the years after World War II,
when companies first began offering pension plans in great numbers. In those
days the workforce was young and retirees were only a sliver of the
population. It was easy to make promises.
The world has changed dramatically since then. In the '40s and '50s, if a
company offered retirement benefits, its competitors probably did too.
Pattern bargaining by unions held entire industries to the same standard.
But companies that once could rely on geographic boundaries and market
dominance to minimize the threat of upstarts and outsiders are now
struggling to keep up in a global marketplace full of new competitors.
Companies like IBM, Verizon Communications (VZ
), and even General Motors today must contend with rivals who don't bear the
cost of old-style benefits. For every lumbering US Airways there's an agile
Southwest or Jet Blue Airways Corp. (JBLU
), newer rivals with cheaper benefits. For every GM, there's a Toyota Motor
Corp., with a leaner and younger U.S. workforce.
Nowhere are pension obligations a greater competitive millstone than in
Detroit. The U.S. carmakers today have some of the biggest pension
obligations and pool of retirees anywhere. By contrast, their Japanese
competition only started U.S. manufacturing in the late 1980s, and have far
lower costs. General Motors has 514,120 participants in its hourly-rate
employee pension plan, all but 142,617 of whom are retired. Pension and
health-care costs for those retirees added up to about $6.2 billion in 2003,
or roughly $1,784 per vehicle according to Morgan Stanley (MWD
). Compare that to Toyota's U.S. (TM
) plan, which had only 9,557 participants, just two of whom were retired as
of Toyota's latest Internal Revenue Service filing covering 2001. Toyota's
pension cost is estimated at something less than $200 per vehicle.
The impact on profits is dramatic. Excluding gains from its finance arm, GM
earned $144 per vehicle in the U.S. in 2003. GM's margins are now 0.5%,
among the worst in the industry. But without the burden of pension and
retiree health-care costs, the auto makers' global margins would be 5.5%,
according to Morgan Stanley. That's not great, but a lot closer to Asian
carmakers like Honda Motor Corp., which earns 7.5% on its global sales.
GOODBYE, RETIREE HEALTH CARE
Companies are racing to cut or drop retiree medical benefits to give a
quick boost to their bottom lines
Retiree health-care coverage, which is easier to eliminate than pensions, is
disappearing even faster. Unlike pensions, which are accrued and funded over
time, retiree health care is paid for out of current cash accounts, so any
cuts immediately bolster the bottom line. Estimates are that as many as half
of the companies offering retiree health care 10 years ago have now dropped
the benefit entirely. Many of those that have not yet slammed the door are
requiring their former workers to bear more of the cost. Some 22% of the
retirees who still get such benefits are now required to pay the insurance
premiums themselves, according to a study by Hewitt Associates Inc. (HEW
). Some 20% of employers told Hewitt that they might make retirees pay
within the next three years. This hits hardest those who retire before 65
and are not yet eligible for Medicare. But even older retirees suffer when
they lose supplemental health benefits like prescription coverage.
IT'S NOT JUST struggling companies, either. IBM, which is already
fighting with retirees in court over changes made to its pension plan in the
1990s, is now getting an earful from angry retirees about health-care costs.
In 1999, IBM capped how much retiree health care it would pay per year at
$7,500 of each employee's annual medical-insurance costs. Although IBM is
certainly in no financial distress -- the company earned $7.6 billion on $89
billion in sales last year -- Big Blue says its medical costs have been
rising faster than revenue. Last year the company says it spent $335 million
on retiree health care.
This year, for the first time, many IBM retirees are beginning to hit the
$7,500 limit. Sandy Anderson, who worked as a manager at IBM's semiconductor
business for 32 years, and today is the acting president of a group of 2,000
retirees called Benefits Restoration Inc., saw his own insurance bill triple
this year. He suspects that the company is trying to make the perk so
expensive that retirees drop it, a cumulative savings calculated by the
group at $100,000 per dropout.
But more than that, Anderson is angry that as a manager, IBM encouraged him
to talk to his staff about retirement benefits as part of their overall
compensation. The job market was tight, and IBM's message was our salaries
aren't the highest, but we will take care of you when you stop working, he
says. Now he feels the company is reneging. "I feel I've misled a lot of
people, that I've lied to people," says Anderson. "It does not sit well with
me at all." IBM says its opt-out levels are low and that it often sees
retirees return to the plan after opting out for a period of time. The
company also argues that it has not changed its approach to retiree medical
benefits for more than a decade and that the rising cost of health care is
the real issue.
Even with the reductions, Anderson and his generation of retirees are better
off than many. In 2003 the giant computer maker said it would pay nothing
toward health insurance for future hires when they retire.
THE PERFECT PENSION STORM
Three years of stock market declines plus record-low interest rates have
left pension funds woefully underfunded
One reason companies have hit the accelerator on dumping their benefits is
because of sharp price increases. Retirement plans have become radically
more expensive in the past two years alone. Due to smoothing mechanisms
built into pension accounting, their investments are still suffering from
the equity market declines of 2000, 2001, and 2002. That has put a big dent
in the value of their stock holdings, generally 60% or more of their total
assets. At the same time, interest rates, which are used to calculate the
size of a company's liability, have remained stubbornly low, implying a
bigger pension liability. Although the recent legislation eases the problem
somewhat, it doesn't nearly close the gap between what these funds owe and
what they have in assets.
Combined with the rise in retirees, those market conditions have led to two
years of record underfunding in company-sponsored plans. A recent study by
analysts at CreditSights Ltd. found that 85% of the defined-benefit plans in
the S&P 500 don't have enough assets to cover their pension obligations.
Together the underfunding equals 15% of their 2003 cash flow. As a result,
companies will have to put billions of dollars of cash into these plans this
year to help close the gap.
It's a drastic turnaround from the late 1990s when these plans had more than
enough money. In 1999, the average S&P 500 pension was overfunded by $726
million, according to CreditSights. Four years later, at the end of 2003, it
was $463 million underfunded, a swing of almost $1.2 billion. A steady rise
in interest rates and a strong stock market could help to solve that
underfunding, but experts worry that the whipsaw effect of the past few
years and the billions companies have been forced to contribute has
heightened executive discomfort with the volatility of pensions. According
to Credit Suisse First Boston (CSR
) analyst David Zion, the companies in the S&P 500 have contributed $88
billion to their pension plans over the past two years. They're likely to
have to add another $31 billion over the next two years. Despite an $18.5
billion infusion into its pension plan in 2003, it will take years before
General Motors, for example, has fully funded plans. "These things have a
fairly long tail," says GM Chairman and CEO G. Richard Wagoner Jr.
Companies didn't make it any easier on themselves by contributing as little
as possible to their pensions in the booming 1990s. As recently as 2001,
half of the large pensions monitored by actuaries at Milliman USA were
generating pension income, contributing an aggregate $12.5 billion boost to
their parent companies' reported earnings. Companies with overfunded pension
plans were often able to fund retiree health care with pension overage. Many
companies contributed little or nothing to their pension plans as the bull
market drove up assets more than enough. Former PBGC chief Kandarian notes
that adjusting for inflation, in the early 1980s plan sponsors were putting
$63 billion per year into their plans. By the last half of the 1990s that
had dropped to $26 billion, and companies had become used to getting
expensive benefits on the cheap.
WHEN THEY DID contribute, it was often not with cash but with stock,
real estate, and other less liquid "alternative" investments. With pension
promises basically free, companies were also offering pension increases in
lieu of salary raises, increasing their obligations. From 1980 to 2000, the
size of the promises made grew 2.3 times, Kandarian says.
Among those making the most extravagant retirement pledges were the steel
mills, and it was in their plans that the industry's weakness was most
dramatically realized. In a massive wave of bankruptcies, the steelmakers
have shifted $7.5 billion of their obligations to the PBGC in the past 3
years.
But in that disaster some have found an opportunity to arbitrage the
difference between the old retirement model and the new. International Steel
Group Inc. (ISG
) has in the past two years grown into the largest steelmaker in the country
by acquiring the mills of old steel companies, including Bethlehem Steel,
LTV, and Acme Metals out of bankruptcy, once they've been freed of pension
and health-care promises. These companies had been pummeled by cheaper
international competition as well as lower-cost U.S. mini-mills, and as they
shrank to cut costs, their retiree bases mushroomed to many times the size
of the active workforce. Faced with the possibility that they would lose all
the remaining jobs left at these companies, the United Steelworkers union
was eventually willing to compromise.
RISK ARBITRAGE
A company free of its retiree promises can become a tougher competitor --
though former workers suffer
Free of those pension promises, ISG chairman Wilbur L. Ross Jr. enjoyed the
big run-up in steel prices on a much cheaper cost base than many of his
competitors. ISG's predecessor companies shed $12 billion of legacy
health-care costs and another $9 billion of pension obligations. The company
today claims to be competitive with both international steelmakers and
efficient U.S.-based mini-mills. ISG's defined-contribution cost for
employees was $45 million in 2003. Its very modest retiree health-care
benefits cost $4.3 million. By contrast, Bethlehem Steel alone was paying
out $500 million a year in pension benefits. Today, U.S. Steel Corp. (X
) has moved to an ISG-style defined-contribution pension plan, but only for
future retirees. It still owes $8 billion to existing pensioners.
It's a bit of retiree-cost arbitrage that won't last forever. But before
it's over, Ross predicts other industries will follow this harsh path to
competitiveness. Those most at risk: textile makers, airlines, tire and
rubber companies, auto-parts suppliers and, potentially, he says, the auto
makers. "There is a huge unfunded liability that's building up because of
the defined-benefit system," says Ross. "If nothing changes, the stone they
[PBGC] have to roll up the hill will just get heavier."
Workers bear the brunt of it. Bill Luoma, head of the Mahoning Valley
Steelworkers Retirees Council, which counts bankrupt LTV retirees among its
members, says that with their health insurance gone, many have stopped
visiting doctors other than for emergencies. For companies struggling to
compete in the global economy, carrying those burdens themselves is like
strapping on a 200-pound weight to run a 40-yard dash. But to shed them is
to leave decades of workers devastated. In the end, someone will have to
pay. The only question is who.
By Nanette Byrnes with David Welch in Detroit
###
The New York Times - July 15, 2004 – Entire Article
By MICHELINE MAYNARD and MARY WILLIAMS WALSH
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United Airlines said yesterday that it would put off making $72.4 million in
payments to its employee pension funds, a move that experts said signaled
that the airline was likely to seek deep cuts in one or more of its
retirement plans.
The action, disclosed in a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission, was the first significant step taken by the bankrupt airline since its application for federal loan guarantees was rejected at the end of June.
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Though United - a subsidiary of UAL - has been in Chapter 11 bankruptcy since December 2002, it has been operating normally; until now it has made good on all its mandatory pension contributions, even as it negotiated other wage and benefit cuts from its unions.
Pension specialists said that United's move was an ominous sign. "In our experience, it's exceedingly rare for companies that miss legally required contributions to later make up the shortfall," said Randy Clerihue, a spokesman for the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, the federally sponsored agency that insures pension plans against default.
United's move came just two days after executives of the airline cautioned employees that the company would have to dig deeper on costs, as it strives to line up new lenders and investors to help it emerge from bankruptcy. The airline said in its filing that the deferral would have no immediate effect on the monthly benefits received by its retirees.
Leaders of some of the company's unions reacted with dismay to the deferral. The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers issued a statement saying United's failure to meet its pension obligations "clearly threatens the stability of those plans." The Association of Flight Attendants said it was worried that the airline might take even more drastic action, by terminating one or more of the plans. Officials for both unions said they had no warning of the airline's move.
But Herb Hunter, a United captain who is a spokesman for the Air Line Pilots Association, said the action made financial sense. "They are trying to do the responsible thing, to conserve cash and get themselves situated to come out of bankruptcy," Mr. Hunter said.
The four pension funds United operates for its workers are in varying states of financial health; by some measures, the pilots' plan is the strongest, and it was not scheduled to receive any of the deferred payments. By another measure, however, United's decision suggested that the pilots were shouldering a growing, but invisible, degree of risk.
If measured as a continuing pension plan with an unlimited future - the method used for calculating contributions - the pilots' plan appears to be fully funded now, and United owes it no additional money. But if it is measured as if it were about to be shut down, the pilots' plan would have a $2.5 billion shortfall, and some pilots would suffer large and painful losses. The government insurance program, already weak, would bear part of the blow.
The other three pension plans at United all have contributions coming due today: $38.6 million for the mechanics, $19.7 million for the flight attendants and $14.1 million for counter representatives and others who deal with the public. All of those are being deferred by the airline.
Since it entered bankruptcy, United has cut its annual costs by some $5 billion, half of it through wage and benefit reductions accepted by its unions last year. Some of those reductions were achieved by slowing the rate that current employees build up their pensions. But the benefits that United's employees and retirees have already earned cannot legally be reduced - short of a full-blown pension default - and they are still being carried on the airline's books as a form of long-term debt. The payments due today were supposed to keep United current on that debt.
Technically, United said it was deferring a decision on whether to make the pension payments, the minimum contributions that airlines with traditional defined-benefit plans must make each quarter. Companies with plans that are fully funded are required to contribute only annually, but most airline plans are currently below that level.
The airline said in its filing that it took the step to "manage resources and preserve its options."
###
The New York Times -
July 14, 2004 – Entire Article
USA
Today - July 11, 2004 – Entire Article
The Washington Post -
July 4, 2004 - Excerpts
Health
Care Costs Darken Sunset Years
Through the first half of the 20th
century, a long and comfortable retirement was something few workers
experienced. Pensions were not common, Social Security was just getting
started, and anyway, most workers died on the job or shortly after retiring.
Then things changed. Social Security flowered. Unions extracted better
pensions and other benefits from employers. New federal laws made if
difficult for employers to renege on promised benefits and provided
government-backed insurance for pensions if employers went broke.
Now, that latter period, especially the years from about 1975 to 2000, is
beginning to look like the golden age of retirement in America. In other
words, those were the good old days, and if you're still working, there's a
good chance you've missed out.
The retirement that looms for many of today's workers is likely to be quite
different. While some will still have that magic combination of Social
Security, a private pension, a 401(k) and company-sponsored retiree medical
insurance, their numbers are shrinking steadily.
The conclusions of experts who study the situation are depressingly uniform.
Retiree medical insurance is fading fast. Private pensions -- the kind that
provide a lifetime stream of income -- have declined drastically over the
past two decades, though they are slipping more slowly now. Social
Security's future is problematic, and workers are not doing well in their
401(k)s.
The do-it-yourself trend in retirement -- and the low participation in
401(k) and similar plans -- is the heart of the problem, and has been
getting some attention lately. But not widely appreciated is the impact of
the disappearance of retiree health insurance.
A new study finds that medical costs can equal 20 percent of pre-retirement
income for a worker who retires at 65 and who has no employer health care
benefits. In other words, a worker who has savings and pension income
adequate to replace all of her pre-retirement income is really 20 percent
short of that unless she has some form of employer medical subsidy. And that
assumes Medicare eligibility. Workers retiring early without employer
medical are projected to have only 59 percent of pre-retirement income left
after medical expenses.
The study, by Hewitt Associates, a benefits-consulting firm based in
Lincolnshire, Ill., notes that other research indicates that retirees need
to have enough resources to replace 85 to 90 percent of their pre-retirement
income to maintain their standard of living.
Hewitt found that only workers who have the entire package, including a
traditional pension and retiree medical, seem likely to reach that level.
Those who have only a 401(k) and Social Security start off at 80 percent of
pre-retirement income and go down from there, depending on whether they have
employer medical and how generous it is. In fact, the study projects that
retirees with only Social Security and a 401(k) and no employer medical
benefits will be left with only 57 percent of their pre-retirement income to
live on.
In fact, the assumptions in the study are such that, if the findings are
correct, many workers will be even worse off. The retirement income
projections assume, among other things, that the worker retires at 65, lives
20 years in retirement and draws down 100 percent of her 401(k) balance
during that time. Since that's right around the actuarial life expectancy of
retirees today, all those who live longer -- and half can expect to -- will
exhaust their 401(k) funds before their death.
Lori Lucas, director of participant research at Hewitt, call the findings "a
wake-up call" for employees.
"Employees need to make their 401(k) programs work harder for them," and
they "need to anticipate the potential cost of paying for much of their
retiree medical themselves," she said.
Lucas added that essentially no employer today thinks seriously of starting
a traditional pension. Companies argue that such pensions are too volatile
in their funding requirements and that their competitors don't have them.
Indeed, those that still have traditional pensions "are wondering if someday
their [retirement plans] will look like this," with only a 401(k) plan.
The study covered 62 large companies with nearly 1 million employees.
Employers' response to Hewitt's findings is that they need to increase
401(k) plan participation and help workers figure out how much they should
be saving. But don't look for additional financial help.
For many workers, the answer is going to be simple and not very pleasant:
They will have to work longer and be retired fewer years. Hewitt found that
working until age 67, instead of 65, and contributing an additional 2
percent of pay to a 401(k) would allow many younger workers to reach 80
percent of pre-retirement income, even with health care costs included.
And, while it's hard to do with jobs in short supply in many parts of the
economy, workers lucky enough to have a choice of employment should look
hard at potential employers' pension offerings, give weight to the best one,
and let the companies know that a good pension is a serious factor in
choosing among them.
Colorado Springs Gazette – July 4, 2004–Excerpts (reprint from San Antonio Express-News)
Much has been said in the past couple of years, but in effect, little has been done about the increasingly high incomes of the nation’s chief executive officers.
Last year, the median salary for CEOs of S&P 500 companies was 27.16 percent more than in 2002, when the median salary was 11.48 percent higher than the year before that.
CEO’s earned a median annual compensation of $2.3 million, and received an additional $2.3 million in restricted stock or realized stock options.
As United Airlines prepares to ask workers for a new round of cutbacks, its pension plans look increasingly vulnerable. The airline has four big plans, and shedding any one could lop off more than $1 billion in debt.
Such a drastic step could nudge other airlines to trim their pension plans as well, to keep their labor costs competitive. The long-term prospect could be a series of failed pension plans and lost benefits reminiscent of those in the steel industry, a costly outcome for the government.
As long as this pattern continues, United could conserve more cash in the short term - and make itself more attractive to lenders - by chopping one or more of its skimpier pension plans. It could either freeze the benefits at their current level, or terminate one or more plans outright - a far more drastic step that would require approval by the bankruptcy court.
Lucent and union paint bleak
picture on pact talks
Retiree
health-care coverage is one problem area
Lucent Technologies was
so eager to wrap up a new labor pact this summer that it began negotiating
with union officials months earlier than expected.
But after two weeks of talks, the two sides have made such little progress,
they may break off bargaining efforts until October, company and union
officials say. The current labor contract runs out on Halloween.
A major sticking point is retiree health-care benefits, an increasing burden
for Lucent. The Murray Hill-based telecommunications gear company is looking
to eliminate dental coverage for retired union workers within four years,
and to sharply increase their out- of-pocket expenses for other care,
according to the Communications Workers of America, the company's main
union.
Lucent expects to pay $240 million out of operating expenses this year for
management retiree health-care costs, a number expected to rise to $300
million for the next two years.
The crunch is expected to get much worse in 2007, when a fund the company
set aside to take care of similar costs for its 77,000 union- represented
retirees is expected to run out. During Lucent's previous round of labor
negotiations last year, union officials agreed to some benefit cuts in
exchange for a company contribution of $76 million to the fund.
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